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This paper studies the geography of wealth transfers during the 2008 global financial crisis. We construct
valuation changes on bilateral external positions in equity, direct investment and portfolio debt at the
height of the crisis to map who benefited and who lost on their external exposure. We find a very diverse
set of fortunes governed by the structure of countries' external portfolios. In particular, we are able
to relate the gains and losses on debt portfolios to the country's exposure to ABCP conduits and the
extent of dollar shortage.
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Two stylized facts dominate the global economy since 1970: the explosion in cross-border
nancial ows and positions, and the -more recent- emergence of unusually large current
account surpluses and decits (the so-called `global imbalances'). In the span of a little
less than two generations, the size and structure of international balance sheets has been
altered dramatically. Consider the case of the United States (Table 1). Forty years ago , in
1971, as the Bretton Woods system of xed but adjustable exchange rates teetered on the
verge of collapse, the United States was a creditor country, with a positive Net International
Investment Position (NIIP) of about 6 percent of U.S. output. More importantly, U.S. gross
external claims and liabilities were quite small, at 17 and 11 percent of output respectively
reecting the large direct and indirect costs of cross-border nancial transactions. About a
third of these cross-border positions took the form of bank loans. Most (80 percent) of the
remaining claims were direct investment, while a sizeable share (45 percent) of remaining
liabilities were in the form of foreign holdings of US government securities. Fast forward
to 2007, on the eve of the worst nancial crisis since the Great Depression. By then, the
U.S. has become a sizeable debtor country, with a negative NIIP of about 12 percent of
output. More dramatically, gross external claims and liabilities soared, respectively, to 119
and 131 percent of output. While cross-border loans still represent roughly a third of cross-
border positions, the structure of the rest of the U.S. external balance sheet has become
substantially more complex. Debt instruments still account for about half of the remaining
external liabilities. However, holdings of US government securities now accounts for only half
of that amount. The other half includes corporate debt and, more importantly, structured
credit instruments such as US mortgage-backed securities. The composition of gross external
claims has changed too, with equity holdings and direct investment each accounting for 40
percent of remaining external claims. The case of the United States is hardly unique. As
the seminal work of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001) and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007)
has demonstrated, cross-border participations increased tremendously for many countries,
1including all advanced economies.
Beyond this common trend, however, countries dier markedly in the structure of their
external balance sheet. As Gourinchas and Rey (2007) and others have pointed out, the U.S.
external balance sheet displays a very specic pattern: short in `safe' or liquid securities and
long in `risky' or illiquid ones. Interestingly, these patterns can persist through time, despite
the profound structural transformations described above. For instance, the share of `safe'
and liquid securities {dened as bank loans and debt instruments{ in overall US external
liabilities was 67 percent in 1971 and 63 percent in 2007. Similarly, the share of `risky' and
illiquid securities in gross external claims {dened as direct investment and equity claims{
was 54 percent in 1971 and 60 percent in 2007 (see Table 1). What constitutes `safe' or `risky'
securities may have changed over time, but the overall pattern of liquidity and maturity
transformation revealed by the analysis of the U.S. external balance sheet did not.
If the U.S. invests abroad in risky assets and funds itself with safe liabilities, two impli-
cations follow. First, we expect the US to earn a risk premium. A large body of evidence
on this question strongly suggests that it does (see Gourinchas, Rey and Govillot (2010) for
recent estimates).1 Second, and this is the focus of this paper, the US should suer dispro-
portionate losses in times of crisis, when the value of its risky external nancial portfolio
collapses relative to the value of its safe external liabilities. As Gourinchas, Rey and Govillot
(2010) document, this is indeed the case. Between 2007:4 and 2009:1, the US net foreign
asset position deteriorated by 21% of GDP, of which about 16% represents the net valuation
loss suered by the US on its external portfolio (Table 2). This valuation loss amounts to
roughly $2,200 billion. Losses were especially acute for US equity and direct investments
abroad which shrunk in half over that period while U.S. government debt liabilities increased
by almost $1,000 bn, or about 7 percent of output.2
1But see Curcuru, Dvorak and Warnock (2008) for a contrarian view.
2Some of the decline in equity and direct investment represents net sales of foreign assets by US investors
over that period since both US and foreign investors `retrenched' during the crisis (Forbes and Warnock
(2010)). Some of the increase in US government securities liabilities to foreigners also represent net purchases
of these instruments over the period.
2By construction, if the US is persistently short `safe' and liquid assets and long `risky'
and illiquid ones, the rest of the world must display -in the aggregate{ the exact opposite
pattern: long in `safe' or liquid assets and short in `risky' or illiquid ones. In normal times,
it earns lower return on its safe external claims than it pays on its risky external liabilities.
In times of crisis, however, the valuation loss of the US represents a valuation gain for the
rest of the world. In some of our other work (Gourinchas, Rey and Govillot (2010)), we have
argued that this pattern of wealth transfer in crisis times and excess returns in normal times
can be interpreted as a form of risk sharing between the US and the rest of the world where
the US plays the role of a `global insurer'. Because of their deep, liquid and historically
safe market for government securities, the U.S. exhibit a comparative advantage in liquidity
and maturity transformation. Since these attributes have remained largely intact through
the modern period, they also help us understand why the US retains its role at the center
of the International Monetary System, despite the lack of formal arrangement since the
collapse of the Bretton Woods system and why the structure of its external balance sheet,
while experiencing profound transformations, still performs essentially the same aggregate
liquidity and maturity transformation functions. Unlike earlier explanations emphasizing
the role of trade or economic size and network externalities for the determination of the
international currency, this interpretation emphasizes instead that it is a combination of
domestic nancial development, economic size, and the scal capacity of the sovereign, that
determine whose currency and government security endogenously emerge as reserve currency
and reserve asset.3
It does not follow from the preceding discussion that all countries benet equally from
their exposure to the US. It is well-known, for instance, that the nancial crisis, having
3Currency internationalisation has been discussed in various contexts in the literature - see for example
Cohen (1971), McKinnon (1979), Krugman (1984), Alogoskous and Portes (1993), Matsuyama, Kiyotaki
and Matsui (1993), Zhou (1997), Hartmann (1998), Portes and Rey (1998), Rey (2001). The role of the centre
country in the international monetary system has mostly been construed as the one of international liquidity
provider. Because the medium of exchange function is characterized by network externalities, large economies
and economies dominating world trade such as nineteenth century Britain issue the international currency .
The importance of network externalities in foreign exchange markets is reected in their organization around
vehicle currencies through which most of the transactions are done.
3originated in the subprime segment of the U.S. housing market, propagated to rest of the
world partly through the heavy losses some European nancial institutions suered on their
holdings of US mortgage-backed securities (Acharya and Schnabl (2010)). Recent work also
documents that many emerging market economies concentrated their -growing- holdings of
external nancial claims in the form of US government securities, which provided a safe
haven in the midst of the crisis (Bernanke et al. (2011) and Bertaut et al. (2011)). These
two examples illustrate the fact that dierent countries or regions may choose dierent locus
on the risk-return frontier oered by the menu of US nancial assets. Beyond these direct
linkages, dierent countries may also have substantially dierent indirect exposure, through
their holdings of third-country assets, themselves dierentially exposed to the nancial crisis.
For instance, some countries may hold equity and debt claims on the European nancial
sector, and thus be indirectly exposed to US housing risk. Others, as discussed extensively
by McGuire and von Peter (2009) in the context of the European dollar shortage, may rely
on short-term foreign currency borrowing, exposing themselves to rollover and funding risk
and to potentially severe deleveraging. Hence, countries were simultaneously hurt by their
exposure to the US nancial markets (especially structured credit products) and sheltered
from the global nancial storm trough their holdings of Treasuries and Agencies debt.
The determinants of international portfolios can be quite complex and it is not the
purpose of this paper to explain the heterogeneity of portfolios across countries.4. Rather,
we take them as given and explore the consequences of the crisis on net and gross foreign
asset positions.
Understanding the overall structure of global nancial linkages during the nancial crisis
and the associated wealth transfers requires that we go beyond measuring changes in gross
and net foreign positions as recorded in the Net International Investment Position. Instead,
one needs estimates of bilateral external claims and liabilities and of their change during
the crisis. Such data would allow us to answer the following critical question: where did the
4For recent attempts to endogenize the portfolio structures of the US vis a vis the rest of the world, see
Mendoza, Quadrini and Rios-Rull (2009) and Gourinchas, Rey and Govillot (2010).
4$2,200 billion US wealth transfer go?5 This paper represents an attempt at answering this
question. It produces the rst `heat-map' of the geographic distribution of gains and losses,
by country and asset class between 2007:4 and 2008:4 for portfolio and direct investment,
such as gure 1. This gure reports gains and losses in billion of US dollar in green and
red respectively. Darker red corresponds to countries who suered larger losses (in excess of
$600bn) while darker green colors corresponds to winners with gains in excess of $400bn. It
identies relative winners and losers from the nancial crisis, once direct and indirect external
wealth transfers are taken into account. To be sure, most countries were badly hit by the crisis
and their total nancial wealth declined massively as we will see shortly. But, at the same
time, they made gains and losses on their external asset positions, which are not negligible,
even when compared to total wealth losses. Furthermore, external valuation gains and losses
diered greatly across countries, so that there are relative losers and relative gainers. For
instance, according to gure 1 countries like China, the Eurozone, or Switzerland all suered
external losses, although more moderate than the US, while the UK enjoyed signicant net
gains on its external position.
In this paper we focus on this heterogeneity, which depends on the geography of cross
border linkages. We build on the careful and timely work of Milesi-Ferretti, Strobbe and
Tamirisa (2010) who construct a dataset of bilateral gross and net external positions on the
eve of the nancial crisis for countries and groups of countries accounting for more than
97 percent of global external assets and liabilities.6 We extend their work along several
dimensions. First, we construct quarterly estimates of net and gross bilateral positions from
2007:4 to 2008:4. Second, we present separate estimates of bilateral positions for Brazil,
Russia, India, and most importantly, China, by relying on hand collected data of the balance
sheet of large state banks, in particular. This enables us to have a more precise measure of
Chinese portfolio debt and equity holdings. Third, we decompose the role of the exchange
rates and of asset prices in accounting for the gains and losses on external positions. Finally,
5For an early discussion of this issue see the interesting column of Milesi-Ferretti (2009) in voxeu.
6Earlier work by Kubelec and Sa (2010) also constructs bilateral holdings between 1980 and 2005 for a
larger group of countries using gravity equations to ll-in some of the positions.
5we study the bilateral determinants of gains and losses during the height of the crisis.
Our analysis is in some ways similar to He, Khang and Krishnamurthy (2010) who studied
balance sheet adjustments during the nancial crisis. Their analysis focused on the balance
sheet of various US nancial institutions and changes in holdings of securitized assets. Ours
concentrates on the external wealth of nations and changes in bilateral holdings of various
broad classes of assets. Both shed light on the evolution of leverage during the crisis.
It is important to emphasize from the outset that data limitations induce substantial
uncertainty in an exercise of this nature. High quality data on bilateral positions and ows
are not systematically available. Instead, we are forced to rely on a number of empirical
assumptions and educated guesses in putting together our database. Important data limita-
tions arise from the limited coverage of bilateral banking transactions at market value; the
residence principle that underlies balance of payment data and results in excessively large
holdings attributed to custodial and oshore nancial centers; and the general lack of data
availability for some groups of countries, including oshore nancial centers, many middle
east oil producing countries as well as some emerging economies. Nevertheless, we believe
that despite the necessary inaccuracies implied by our empirical assumptions, some consis-
tent patterns emerge from the data, which will survive the additional empirical scrutiny that
we hope will be possible in the near future. We also endeavour to provide several versions of
the estimates of gains and losses of countries, some multilateral, some bilateral, some which
includes oshore centres, some which ventilates their positions across countries, some based
on FDI estimated at market value, some where FDI is at current cost, etc... in order to do
robustness checks.
Our exercise reveals a number of important ndings. First, as exemplied in gure 1, we
see large valuation changes during the crisis period, varying widely across countries. Most
countries made capital gains on their portfolio equity positions in the crisis as they were
either short on equity overall (like the UK, who made a gain of about $284 bn {see Table 3)
or held equity assets whose value declined less than equity liabilities during the crisis. On
6the other side, taking the capital loss, is of course the US, who is long equity and made very
large losses on its portfolio equity position ($1,153bn, according to table 3). The structure of
the external debt portfolio, in particular whether debt assets are mostly government bonds
or corporate bonds or asset backed mortgage securities, is also a crucial determinant of the
valuation gains and losses. Countries who self-insured by holding mostly foreign government
bonds tended to limit their losses or even post gains on their net debt portfolios, while
countries who levered heavily to invest in risky asset backed mortgage securities or other
toxic assets experienced losses on their net debt. We nd a clear positive correlation in the
data between the countries with losses on their net debt portfolios and those who set-up
ABCP conduits. Though the sample coverage is relatively small, we also nd a positive
correlation between countries who set up ABCP conduits and the McGuire and von Peter
(2009) measure of US dollar shortage, suggesting that the lack of dollar liquidity in the
banking system was associated with important losses on external debt portfolios.
The next section reviews the evolution of the external balance sheets of the countries
in our sample, puts them in perspective by comparing them to changes in total wealth
of countries. We provide a world heatmap of external losses and decompose the eect of
exchange rates and asset prices on capital gains and losses. Section 3 discusses our empirical
methodology to construct bilateral gross and net positions for portfolio and direct asset
holdings, for which we have the most detailed data and presents the matrices of bilateral
gains and losses by asset class. Section 4 relates the distribution of wealth transfers to
observable determinants, such as the exposure to asset backed commercial paper (ABCP),
the overall dollar shortage as well as to measures of the regulatory environment. Section 5
concludes.
2 External Balance Sheet Adjustments
We begin our analysis by reviewing the evolution of the aggregate external balance sheet
for a large sample of countries from the end of 2007 to the end of 2008. This period covers
7the most acute phase of the crisis during the fourth quarter of 2008 following the collapse of
Lehman Brothers, and is therefore the most relevant from the perspective of wealth transfers.
The recovery in many asset markets around the world in 2009 did reverse some of the
wealth transfers documented in this paper, perhaps as a result of the coordinated and ag-
gressive macroeconomic policies that may have helped stabilize the world economy. What
interests us here is a measure of the external wealth transfers resulting directly from the
crisis itself, i.e. measured at a time when the possibility and the eectiveness of coordinated
countercyclical policies remained remote and the risk of a second Great Depression was on
everyone's mind. It would be interesting to quantify the impact of these external transfers
on the recovery path of the real economy across countries. Such an enterprise however goes
well beyond the current paper. One diculty consists in controlling for the relative size
of the shocks hitting the various economies. Another lies in the endogeneity of the policy
responses. Instead, this paper focuses on the determinants of the relative gains and losses
on the external positions of countries and put those valuations in perspective by comparing
them to the contemporaneous changes in domestic household wealth.
2.1 Data and Methodology
Our sample includes most industrial countries (Canada, the Euro area, Japan, Switzerland,
the UK, the US), a group of other advanced economies (Australia, Denmark, New Zealand,
Norway and Sweden), some major emerging economies (Brazil, China, India, Russia, Singa-
pore, Hong-Kong) and a group of emerging Asian economies composed of Indonesia, South
Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. Missing from this sample are oil exporters
and oshore nancial centers, both with potentially large gross and net cross-border posi-











7See Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2009) for some estimates of oshore nancial centers net asset positions.
We will use some bilateral data on oshore nancial centres in section 3 and assess the robustness of our
results when we include them in our bilateral estimates of valuations.
8where NAi
t denotes the net foreign asset position at time t for country i and CAi
t the current
account balance during period t: We further break down the net foreign asset position into








t represents the net position of country i in asset class c at
time t. Using the balance of payment identity, we can write the valuation term as the sum of
the changes in the net asset position by asset classes, NA
i;c
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2.2 Aggregate gains and losses
We collect quarterly and annual data on foreign assets and liabilities, at market value when-
ever possible, with corresponding nancial ows, for this set of 11 individual countries and
3 country groups between 2007 and 2009. Assets and liabilities positions are broken down
into the following assets classes: portfolio debt, portfolio equity, direct investment, other in-
vestment and reserves (with matching ows, but excluding nancial derivatives). For debt,
equity, direct investment and other investment positions we rely on national sources for
Canada, China, the Euro Area, Japan, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States
whereas for all other countries, data are from the IMF Balance of Payments Statistics. For
reserves we use \Total reserves minus gold" obtained from the IMF International Financial
Statistics. All ow data were obtained from the IMF Balance of Payments Statistics.9
We rst oer a geographical `heatmap' of aggregate gains and losses around the globe
in gure 1. As mentioned previously, countries with darker red colors bear the larger losses
(in excess of $600bn). The lighter red color represents smaller losses. Similarly, countries
with dark green color enjoyed the largest gains (in excess of $400 bn) while lighter green
represents smaller gains. Countries in plain white, such as, for example, African countries,
8The sum of net nancial ows equals the current account balance, up to errors and omissions and
unilateral transfers and remittances, which we ignore in this decomposition.
9For more details on our data see the Appendix.
9are those for which we have no data. At a glance, we can see that most of the external
valuation losses are spread across the US, the Euro Area, Switzerland and China (Australia
and other advanced economies made very moderate losses). The UK on the other hand is at
the other end of the spectrum and made large capital gains on its net external asset position,
while Brazil, Russia and India made moderate gains.
Table 3 reports the corresponding numerical estimates (all the numbers are in billions of
US$) and gures 2-3 present the corresponding heatmap for each asset class (debt, equity,
FDI and foreign exchange) with the same color coding. Finally, gure 4 reports the break-
down of gains/losses by asset class and country. For each country, or group of countries,
this last gure reports V Ai
t (the solid line) as well as the various components NAic
t  NF ic
t
according to equation (1).10
Figure 4 also includes the valuation gain/loss for the `rest of the world' (RoW), dened as





ation term accounts both for incomplete geographical coverage as well as any measurement
error. Accordingly, its interpretation should be subject to extra caution.
For the purpose of comparability across countries, we constructed gure 4 and Table 3
with US direct investment positions measured at current cost. This brings down the overall
US valuation loss between 2007:4 and 2008:4 from -$2,069bn when using direct investment
at market value as in Table 1 and 2, to -$863bn.11.
A number of important features emerge from the data. First, the simple proposition that
the US suered a valuation loss while other countries gained uniformly is not supported by
the data. The Euro area, mainland China and Switzerland all experienced sizeable losses, of
$185bn, $158bn and $53bn respectively whereas the UK ($542bn), Russia ($317bn), Brazil
($292bn) and emerging Asia ($245bn) were the main net beneciaries. Taken together, the
countries of our sample {outside the US{ experienced a positive wealth transfer of $1,145bn
10For table 3 and 4 we grouped debt and foreign exchange reserves in the debt category.
11The valuation component on US net direct investment at market value is -$1,150bn and $56bn at current
cost. By construction, the dierence, equal to $1,206bn, must be accounted for by valuation gains on net
direct investment (at market value) in other countries. The next section will provide rough estimates of
bilateral direct investment positions at market value.
10exceeding the $863bn losses of the U.S., the dierence being attributed to the rest of the
world.
Second, most of the US losses arise from the $1,153bn decline in its net equity portfolio.
By construction, the cross section distribution of valuations within each asset class sums to












t : Inspection of table 3 and gure 4 reveals that the counterpart
of the US net equity losses were widely distributed, most countries realizing gains on their
equity portfolio, especially the Euro area ($506bn), the UK ($284bn), Russia ($208bn), Brazil
($205bn), emerging Asia ($192bn) and Japan ($176bn). In all these countries, the gains arise
from a drastic reduction in the value of equity liabilities, relative to equity holdings. All these
countries had short cross border equity positions as of 2007.
Third, the gains/losses attributable to US cross-border portfolio debt holdings are rela-
tively small, all of the increase in debt liabilities ($505bn) being more than accounted for by
gross capital inows ($591bn) especially into US government securities. The small associ-
ated valuation loss on US portfolio debt liabilities (-$86bn) underlies the relative stability of
U.S. government securities during the crisis. By contrast, the U.K., experienced a valuation
gain of $339bn on its net debt position, largely due to the decline in the value of its debt
liabilities (-$515bn), some of which can be attributed to the decline in the value of the Ster-
ling relative to the US dollar during that period. Conversely, the Euro area suered large
valuation losses on its external debt claims (-$461bn) most likely related to the collapse in
the value of its portfolio of US structured credit products. Overall, the contrast between
these three countries is consistent with the US issuing safe public debt and risky private-label
debt (see Bernanke et al. (2011)); the Euro area holding a portfolio of risky private-label
debt assets; the U.K. issuing Sterling denominated debt and risky private-label debt both of
which declined in value during the crisis.
11Fourth, despite large holdings of U.S. public securities China suered an overall negative
wealth transfer during the crisis ($158bn), representing about 3.5 percent of its output.
China also suered a $61bn loss on its foreign exchange reserve holdings, as a result of
the markdown on its non-dollar reserves when most currencies lost ground against the US
dollar.12 13. These ndings highlight that the decline in China's net external wealth would
have been much more pronounced, were it not for its large holdings of US government
securities.
Taken together, the results from table 3 and gure 4 reveal a remarkable pattern. If
we dene ex-post global insurers as the set of countries that provided signicant positive
transfers to the rest of the world during the nancial crisis, this set includes the following
countries: the United States ($863bn, 6 percent of GDP), the Euro area ($185bn, 1.36
percent of GDP), Switzerland ($53bn, 10.6 percent of GDP) and China ($158bn, 3.5 percent
of GDP).14 The channels through which each of these countries experienced valuation losses
vary. For the US, it is the collapse in its long net equity position, relative to its short debt
position, which did not decline nearly as much. For Switzerland and the Euro area, it is
the decline in the value of their debt holdings, which were infested by toxic assets, and the
decline in the value of their long direct investment position. For China, as discussed above,
it is the losses on the non-dollar components of its foreign exchange reserves, due to a dollar
appreciation.
These ndings indicate that the heatmap of gains and losses is substantially more complex
than expected. In particular, it suggests that it is incorrect to think of the United States as
12We measure gains and losses in dollars. If we measured valuation eects in a currency basket instead,
such as the SDR, China would record a gain of about 2.6 bn SDR on its ocial foreign exchange holdings,
as the SDR depreciated against the dollar at the height of the crisis. Except for this "level eect" the choice
of a numeraire has no consequence on our results.
13The ocial IIP gures also indicate increases in the value of Chinese FDI and equity liabilities. These
numbers are however not at market value. Given that the Chinese stock market suered a massive decline
during the crisis, Chinese liabilities are likely to be overstated in ocial IIP data. Hence, Chinese losses are
likely to be also overstated. In the next section of the paper we discuss in more details the shortcomings of
Chinese data.
14Technically, the list should also include Singapore ($56bn valuation loss representing 29 percent of its
output). However, Singapore is a regional nancial center and discrepancies between claims and liabilities
lead to us to interpret these numbers with caution.
12the single provider of global liquidity. The allocation of losses is still extremely asymmetric
{with the US accounting for about 68 percent of the cross border wealth losses, the Euro
area for 15 percent, China for 13 percent and Switzerland for 4 percent.15 Nevertheless
it provides perhaps an early indication that the global economy may have already moved
towards a multilateral system, where the provision of global liquidity is not concentrated in
the hands of the United States any longer. On the whole, our results are also consistent with
the recent work emphasizing the resilience of emerging economies during the recent crisis
(see Kose and Prasad (2010) and Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2011)).
2.3 Exchange rate accounting, total wealth and valuations
The crisis period has been characterized by large gyrations in exchange rates, with, in par-
ticular a substantial appreciation of the dollar against most currencies. It is interesting
to decompose gains and losses on external balance sheets into uctuations in asset prices
(equity, FDI, bond prices) and exchange rate movements. We attempt here such an account-
ing exercise in order to assess how much exchange rate movements explain our change in
valuations.
We use the geographical distribution of bilateral weights of assets and liabilities as well as
some crude assumptions on their currency composition to compute the relevant exchange rate
movements. In particular, we assume that all FDI and equities holdings are in the currency
of the issuer and that all bank loans are fully hedged and hence immune to exchange rate
eects. We use the Lane and Shambaugh's exchange rate weights for the debt data.16
Our results presented in table 4 have striking features. All the countries we identied
15For the reasons mentioned above and discussed in more details below, the numbers for China are likely
to be very imprecise. The share of the US losses in total losses would be even larger if we measured direct
investment at market value since the US valuation loss would be roughly three times as large.
16In our benchmark case, we assume that all the assets that our source countries own in oshore centers
are in US dollars. This may be a problematic assumption for some of our countries, like the UK, which have
susbstantial links with oshore centres and is likely to use sterling for at least part of these transactions. As
a robustness check, we assumed that all the UK assets vis- a-vis all oshore centers are in Sterling. The only
large dierence is for the exchange rate valuation on FDI assets: instead of incurring a loss of $80 bn, the
UK would incur a loss of $156 bn. While not negligible, this is unlikely to change our results in a material
way (UK oshore FDI assets are only 15% of total UK FDI assets).
13in the previous section as ex post global insurers (US, Euro Area, Switzerland, China and
Singapore, with the addition of Japan) suered valuation losses due to adverse exchange rate
movements. These are countries whose currencies have tended to hold rather well or even to
appreciate at the height of the crisis mainly due to their role as safe havens. Liabilities of
these countries are mainly in domestic currency and their assets mainly in foreign currencies,
hence an appreciation of the domestic exchange rate tends to decrease the value of their net
foreign assets. Our table shows that exchange rate movements account for about 31% of
US external valuation changes (when US FDI is measured at market value). This sizable
number (corresponding to a valuation loss of about $650 bn) is not surprising as the currency
composition of US external assets and liabilities is very asymmetric: almost all US liabilities
are in dollars while about two thirds of US assets are in foreign currencies. As the dollar
appreciated sharply in 2008 in part due to inows into the Treasuries market, the value of
US external claims went down. For Switzerland and Japan, the losses stemming from the
strength of their currencies were partly compensated by an increase in the value of their
external claims. Both Switzerland and Japan have short equity positions and benet from a
collapse in equity prices. A contrario, the Sterling collapse led to large exchange rate gains
on the UK net external positions. Those gains explain 139% of the total valuation changes,
meaning that they were partly oset by decreases in the value of UK net external assets
One legitimate question to ask is whether the international wealth transfers this paper
focuses on are relevant compared to the change in domestic nancial wealth that occurred
during the crisis. We report in table 4 (columns (7) and (8)) changes in total domestic
household wealth for the subset of countries for which we could nd data.17 First, declines
in wealth are indeed very large during the period we consider: $17.3 trillion for the United
States, $2.7 trillion for the UK and $2.3 trillion for Japan, $1.3 trillion for the Eurozone.
This should come as no surprise as our period spans the height of the nancial crisis during
which many nancial and real estate markets performed dismally. External valuation gains
17Source: OECD Economic Outlook (2011). Our data cover the US, the UK, the Euro Area (limited here
to Germany, Italy and France), Japan and Canada.
14or losses, though smaller, are nevertheless quite sizeable as a proportion of total wealth
changes. Their absolute value range from 3% (for Japan) to 20% for the UK, reecting both
the openness of the UK as a small open economy and the important role of London as an
international nancial centre. For the US, external valuation changes amount to 12% of
the change in total household wealth, and for the Euro Area 14%. Hence, while there is
no doubt the negative domestic wealth eects dominate the macroeconomic landscape for
most of our countries, the international wealth transfers, determined by the heterogeneity of
external balance sheets, are far from being negligible.
3 Bilateral valuation gains and losses
Our world maps showed considerable geographical heterogeneity in external wealth changes
at the country level. We now rene our analysis and estimate the distributions of bilateral
valuations gains and losses during 2007-2008. Balance of payment data and international
investment positions are based on the concept of residency. This concept is not fully adequate
to analyze risk sharing in the international economy. Ideally, we would like to have data on
nal ownership of assets. These data do not exist for portfolio investment or FDI however,
for which we will have to assume that residency and ownership coincide. The presence of
important nancial links with oshore nancial centres, which act merely as intermediate
nancial platforms distort further the geographical picture of our data.18 All our results are
therefore subjected to these limitations. A second important diculty is the estimation of
bilateral investment positions and bilateral ows in dierent asset classes. Kubelec and Sa
(2010) and Milesi-Ferretti, Strobbe and Tamirisa (2010) have done pioneering work in trying
to estimate bilateral investment positions. Nevertheless, data limitations remain severe in
terms of country coverage in particular and availability of data at market value (see the
appendix for a more detailed discussion of data issues).19
18For an attempt to assess the robustness of our results to the inclusion of oshore centres, see next section.
19We chose not to compute bilateral nancial matrices for bank loans. The locational banking statistics
of the BIS, based on the concept of residency, give data on bilateral banking positions. These data however
153.1 Data and Methodology
For each asset class, we estimate the bilateral distribution of valuation gains and losses
V X
ij
t+1 at time t + 1 between country i and j during the height of the crisis between 2007
Q4 and 2008 Q4. We derive V X
ij












t denotes the holdings of country i in country j at time t; and FX
ij
t represents
the net nancial purchases by residents of country i in country j in the asset class considered
between t and t + 1.
Yearly data on some components of bilateral international portfolios holdings by asset
classes are available through the CPIS survey and other sources in recent years for a number
of countries. Bilateral ow data coverage is, however, generally far from complete or not
available. We use the following methodology to estimate bilateral ows on quarterly data.20
Portfolio debt and portfolio equity
We compute the bilateral portfolio weights w
ij
t of country i vis- a-vis country j for a given
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the CPIS data is not exhaustive, hence the sum of all the bilateral positions of country i for
portfolio debt or equity covered by the CPIS does not correspond to the reported aggregated









t is the reported aggregate (multilateral) international
investment position for country i.21 We denote the aggregate ow in a given asset class by
are bound to be of little use for our purposes as loan books and large parts of the banking books are not
marked to market. The speed of write downs and the provisioning for bad loans have diered widely across
countries and it is unclear how much of this is reected in the BIS numbers of 2007-2008. Furthermore, there
are large dierences between consolidated statistics and locational statistics, suggesting that the concept of
residency, compatible with balance of payment accounting is bound to be very dierent from the ultimate
geographical distribution of gains and losses. Rather than attempt a heroic eort at reconciling loan data
on a bilateral basis, we preferred not to do bilateral nancial matrices for this asset category.
20We provide all our data sources for specic countries in the appendix. When CPIS data are not available
(as in the case of China) we use national data sources.
21We make sure that the valuation methods for the numerator and the denominator are the same.
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t+1, and estimated variables with a `hat'. Our goal is to construct an estimate of the
quarterly bilateral ows F ^ X
ij
t . Our working assumption is that the geographical distribution
of ows over each quarter corresponds to the portfolio weights at the beginning of the quarter.
Scaling total ows in proportion to the data coverage on the positions, it results that our
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t+1 and using these to construct the following quarter bilateral ows etc...
We recover the yearly valuation term in the fourth quarter, V X
ij
t+4; as the dierence
between end of year bilateral positions as recorded in the available surveys, adjusted for our





























where the second line substitutes F ^ X
ij
t+s for its empirical counterpart. We emphasize again
that this approach is quite crude, given the data limitation and is likely to suer from a
number of shortcomings. However, in the absence of more detailed data, it strikes us as
reasonable to assume that ows are allocated proportionally to observed positions.22
22One simple case where our assumption would be violated is one where investors would want to maintain
xed portfolios shares. In that case, investors would rebalance fully their portfolio every period, which would
require underweighting assets that outperform, so that the nancial ows would not be exactly proportional
to beginning of period holdings. Our rule assumes that investors do not follow such a simple, full rebalancing
rule; indeed at the observed frequencies, portfolio weights are time varying.
17Bilateral FDI
For our sample, up-to-date ocial data on FDI at market value is only available for the
following countries: the US, Hong Kong, Japan, Australia and Sweden.23 In order to obtain
bilateral FDI positions at market value we rely wherever possible on ocial estimates of the
aggregate FDI positions at market value. For countries that do not report such estimates,
we update an initial market value estimate by using equity price indices and aggregate FDI
ows. Once we have the derived - or provided - estimate of the aggregate market value FDI
stock for 2007 and 2008, we use the ratio of market value to book value of the aggregate
stock to infer the bilateral FDI stocks at market value.
For the US, the BEA provides market value of the aggregate FDI stock which we use
to convert the bilateral BEA FDI positions at historical cost to market value. The same
method is used for Japan (where market value estimates are provided by the Bank of Japan)
and Sweden (with data from the Swedish Rijksbank).
For the UK, Switzerland, Denmark, Canada and China we rely on an initial estimate of
the aggregate FDI positions at market value which we update by using destination coun-
try equity indices and aggregate direct investment ows. We rely on Kubelec, Orskaug and
Tanaka (2007) for UK direct investment positions as of 2005; Kumah, Damgaard and Elkjaer
(2009) for Denmark in 2006; Stoes and Tille (2009) for Switzerland in 2005 and Statistics
Canada for Canada in 2005 (see the appendix for a more detailed discussion of our mar-
ket value estimation methodology). For the remaining countries in our sample we rely on
bilateral DI positions at market value derived from partner countries sources. With these
estimates of yearly positions in hand, we construct bilateral FDI ows and valuations using
the same approach as for portfolio debt and equity.
Bilateral Foreign exchange data
For the currency composition of foreign exchange reserves we use national sources (Canada,
Russia, Switzerland and the UK) or else adopt the 2007 currency share of ocial reserves
23Of those, only Australia and Hong-Kong use market value as the primary FDI valuation method in their
ocial IIP release.
18provided in Milesi-Ferretti, Strobbe and Tamirisa (2010) for 2008. For China, the currency
composition of reserves is usually not disclosed. We use the 2010 weights, as this is the only
year for which data are available. While this strategy is by no means optimal, we believe any
resulting errors to be comparatively small, in view of the relative stability of foreign reserve
currency shares over time.
Bilateral FX reserves valuations are computed using exchange rate movements applied
to the currency composition of reserves. We prefer this direct valuation method as ows
are bound to be very badly observed (reserve ows are kept condential by some countries),
while exchange rate movements and currency composition are relatively accurate.
Treatment of oshore nancial centres
The main oshore centres are in our sample.24 Though the reporting is spotty (see
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2009) for a thorough study) there are some important cross border
positions between some oshore centres (such as the Cayman Islands and the Bahamas, for
example) and advanced economies. It is very unlikely that the ultimate owners of nancial
assets bought by oshore centres are actual residents of o-shore centres. Rather, oshore
centres act as intermediaries to channel funds across the globe, reecting, among other things,
tax \optimization" and tax evasion. Zucman (2011) shows that a signicant amount of rich
countries wealth seem to evaporate via those channels.
Because, by design, the traceability of the geography of nancial ows emanating from
and going into oshore centres is limited, we make two dierent assumptions in the course
of our analysis and investigate the robustness of our results. First we simply take the
oshore centres out of the bilateral nancial matrices. This means that we focus only on
the nancial linkages across countries that are explicitly (even if imperfectly) recorded in
ocial data. Second, we assume that the bulk of oshore nancial transactions is done to
go around domestic scal authorities, legally or illegally. Hence most of those transactions
are really domestic transactions intermediated oshore. We therefore redistribute oshore
24These include Aruba, Andorra, Bahamas, Barbados, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands,
Gibraltar, Guernsey, Isle of Man, Jersey, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Macao, Mauritius, Monaco, Netherland
Antilles, Panama, Samoa, San Marino, Vanuatu, Vatican, West Indies
19centres external assets and liabilities to the other countries of our samples in the following
way. Take the US-Bahamas example. We assume that part of the external assets of the US
towards the Bahamas are actually US-US investments and we ventilate the rest according
to the weights of the US portfolio on external assets. Specically we use the home bias of
the US equity portfolio to determine how many US-Bahamas claims are really US domestic
claims. On the liability side, we do a similar breakdown: US liabilities vis- a-vis the Bahamas
are assumed to be US-US liabilities (same home bias weight) and the remainder is ventilated
according to the weights in the US external liability portfolio.25
While these assumptions on oshore centers have some eect on the results, especially for
the countries which trade most with oshore centers, such as the US, the UK and the euro
area, the overall pattern of transfers does not change, whether in the aggregate or by asset
classes.26 We conclude that while there is no denying oshore centres introduce some degree
of uncertainty in the geographical distribution of gains and losses, the relative magnitudes
are such that they probably are not large enough to signicantly alter our global heatmaps.
3.2 Bilateral Financial Matrices
Traditionally, the propensity of countries to experience a nancial crisis has been linked
to large current account decits and net imbalances. As nancial globalization proceeds,
cross border asset positions are growing at a rapid rate, and balance sheet eects are be-
coming increasingly important: even countries with net balanced positions and no current
account decit can become nancially illiquid. Nowadays, nancial fragility has to be as-
sessed through information on gross external asset positions, disaggregated by asset classes.
Tracking the process of international transmission of nancial shocks involves knowing the
network of bilateral gross exposures of countries. Hence, we believe that the construction of
bilateral matrices such as the ones we are presenting in this paper for the 2007-2008 crisis,
25The home bias weights for equity and bonds are taken from Coeurdacier and Rey (2010). For FDI, we
use the same home bias weights as for the equity portfolio.
26Bilateral nancial matrices with ventilation of oshore positions are not reported here due to lack of
space. They are available upon request.
20can be of great interest to understand better systemic risk and the propagation of shocks at
the international level. In what follows we present bilateral nancial matrices on gains and
losses by asset categories (portfolio debt, equity and FDI).
There are several ways of constructing valuation matrices. We can use data on bilateral
assets and liabilities of reporting countries or alternatively use data based only on the asset
side of reporting countries. Because data on the asset side is usually more reliable (see
Milesi-Ferretti, Strobbe and Tamirisa (2010) for a discussion), this is what we present in this
section.
Matrix of bilateral valuation gains and losses on the net equity portfolio
Each matrix presents in columns the source country and in rows the destination countries.
Hence if we look at the bilateral ventilation of portfolio equity assets (table 5), in the rst
column and second row (Brazil- Canada), the number 4,079 means that Brazil is making
a valuation gain of $4,079 millions on its net equity asset portfolio vis- a-vis Canada (and
conversely that Canada is making a valuation loss of the same amount in the rst row/second
column of the table). The numbers across the diagonal are symmetric as we used exclusively
assets data. Several facts are noteworthy. First, despite the dierence in coverage and
the assumptions we had to make when constructing the data, the sum of our bilateral
valuations (equal to $162,796 millions for Brazil) is usually reasonably close to the total
valuations computed directly from aggregated net positions in Table 3. In principle, the two
numbers should not necessarily be equal since the latter includes all countries while the
bilateral coverage in Table 5 is more limited. Nevertheless, the numbers should be close if
the omitted countries do not account for a signicant share of cross-border equity positions.
For the United States, for instance, the two numbers are strikingly close (-$1,218 billions
versus -$1,153 billions).27 Second, we uncover a remarkable geographical pattern of gains
and losses. As risky assets valuation plummeted during the crisis, the United States, with
27For other countries, the sum of our bilateral valuation eects can dier substantially. The discrepancy
is largest for China where aggregate equity data indicate a small valuation loss of $12 billions, while our
cumulated bilateral valuations report a gain of $186 billions. Besides measurement issues, the dierence
could be due in part to valuation losses that China experienced against countries not included in our sample.
21long equity positions vis- a-vis each of the other geographical entities in our sample, suered
across the board losses. Furthermore, after controlling for their bilateral equity portfolio
gain against the US, all other advanced economies except Japan also made losses on their
net equity position, reecting their overall short equity position vis-a-vis the US and long
position against the rest of the world. The case of the UK is particularly interesting. It
registers one of the biggest gain on its portfolio equity ($198 billions) and is characterized
by a massive short position vis- a-vis the US and a somewhat smaller short position vis- a-vis
the Euro Area and Canada. Emerging markets, on the other hand, tend to be short equity
vis- a-vis most of their partners, and as a result, beneted from the worldwide fall in equity
markets. This is particularly clear for the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China)
who make gains on most of their bilateral net equity positions.
Matrix of bilateral valuation gains and losses on the net debt portfolio.
The data on portfolio debt presented in table 6 show bigger gaps in coverage than the
equity data. In particular, the data coverage for the Euro area and the UK seems particularly
limited, as revealed by the comparison between the sum of bilateral gains and losses and the
aggregate gure obtained directly from the IIP in Table 3. Data coverage for the United
States seems adequate since we report a valuation loss of $58 billions while the aggregate
position indicates $46 billions. It would be ideal to be able to distinguish between government
debt and corporate debt, including structured credit products Unfortunately this breakdown
is not available. Hence the net valuation on the debt portfolio will depend on the relative
weights of US treasuries, say, versus asset-backed mortgage securities in countries portfolios.
As indicated, our matrix also does not include ocial reserve holdings with the data on
debt (unlike Table 3 above which aggregated the two). According to Bernanke et al. (2011),
saving glut economies such as China and Emerging Asia have concentrated their portfolio
holdings into government bonds, pushing downwards their yields and inducing more advanced
economies, in particular the euro area to invest in higher yielding securities, such as ABCP.
Our data seem consistent with this narrative, as the Euro Area has a large long position in
US debt in 2007, which translated in large losses during the crisis. Similarly, other advanced
22economies, Canada, Switzerland, who were also long in US debt and had presumably a
similar portfolio structure as the Euro area made losses on their net debt liabilities. A
noticeable exception is the UK, who, despite a long position in US debt realized a massive
gain, due mainly to the collapse of the value of US debt assets in the UK. The US makes gains
on its net debt portfolio vis- a-vis most advanced economies (except the UK) and conversely
makes losses vis- a-vis Russia and Hong Kong, which are likely to have accumulated more
US government bonds than corporate debt.
Matrix of bilateral valuation gains and losses on the net FDI portfolio
Comparing the sum of our bilateral net valuations for FDI at market value presented
in Table 7 with the aggregate data on valuation estimated from reported IIP, our data
coverage is clearly limited for some areas.28 The Euro area coverage in particular seems
most problematic, since the sum of bilateral valuations indicates a gain of $575 billions,
while the corresponding aggregate gure in Table 3 is a loss of $334 billions (based on FDI
at book value). It seems unlikely that the discrepancy, a valuation loss in excess of $1,000
billions, could be accounted for purely by the gaps in our geographic coverage, especially
vis- a-vis other emerging markets. With this caveat in mind, the results on bilateral direct
investment still present some interesting features. Japan has net DI assets vis- a-vis all the
countries in our sample, except Switzerland. Consequently, it suered bilateral losses against
each country (except Switzerland and India). Similarly the US made large losses vis- a-vis
the Euro area against which it holds a large long position. UK FDI in the US seems to have
particularly underperformed and is responsible for the gain that the US makes on its net
FDI portfolio vis- a-vis the UK.
Matrix of bilateral valuation gains and losses on the foreign exchange reserves
Since the dollar is the dominant reserve currency, using the dollar as the num eraire would
28Note that for this matrix, we constructed market value FDI estimates wherever possible (see Appendix).
Thus, the data presented here diers from the data presented in Table 3, where, e.g. for the US we used FDI
at current cost to allow for better comparability across countries and, similarly, most other countries use
book values to compile their aggregate FDI data. In consequence, the sum of bilateral valuations in Table 7
is not directly comparable with the aggregate gures in Table 3.
23lead to many entries being zero.29 For this matrix (and only this one), we therefore chose
to express valuations in terms of the SDR basket in Table 8. For the 2006-2010 period, the
SDR weights were 44% dollar, 34% euro, 11% yen, 11% sterling. Since the SDR depreciated
against the US dollar and the yen in 2008, countries holding reserves predominantly in US $
and /or yen have seen their ocial reserves appreciate, when measured in SDR. For example,
China made moderate net gains on its foreign reserves during this period, because of the
strengthening of the dollar and the yen. China made some losses on its euro and, even
more sizably on its sterling reserves. Russia, on the other hand suered net losses due to its
exposure to euro and sterling assets. So did the euro area, as it is heavily exposed to sterling
assets.
4 Determinants of gains and losses
It is now well understood that before the crisis, a number of AAA-rated securities (mostly
asset-backed mortgage securities) were perceived as perfect substitutes for US government
securities. Following Bernanke et al. (2011), let us call them `private-label' safe assets. Even-
tually, the safety of the private label assets proved illusory, and their price spiralled down-
wards during the crisis. By contrast, US Treasuries held-up remarkably well and even saw
their price rise due to inows of capital seeking safe haven protection (see McCauley and
McGuire (2009)). Acharya and Schnabl (2010) estimate that the banks around the world
manufactured over $1,200 billion of these `private-label' safe assets by selling short-term
Asset-Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP) via conduits to risk-averse investors and investing
the proceeds primarily in long-term U.S. securities. As liquidity in the dollar money markets
dried-up in 2007, many banks found themselves unable to roll over these ABCP and forced
to reinstate the mortgages from the conduits on their balance sheet, with signicant losses.
Bilateral exposure data are ideal to investigate the macroeconomic impact of those invest-
29We assume that currency and residency coincide, i.e. Chinese holdings of US$ reserves are assets of
China on the US. As there are few reserve currencies, there are already a large number of zeros in this
matrix.
24ments by commercial banks, i.e. whether countries whose banks set up large asset-backed
commercial paper conduits also experienced large losses on their external debt portfolios,
as measured by the \Survey on Portfolio holdings of U.S. Securities". Figure 5 illustrates
the positive correlation between the share of ABCP conduits in total external debt positions
as of 2007 and the rate of losses made on external debt portfolios between 2007 Q4 and
2008 Q4.30 Though the sample is small, the correlation is strikingly positive, suggesting
that setting up ABCP conduits is a major determinant of aggregate losses on external debt.
Furthermore, there is a strong mapping between the geographical distributions of losses and
the share of the various areas in total ABCP holdings. As pointed out in Bernanke et al.
(2011), the Euro area leveraged massively to invest in those private-label safe assets ending
up holding 40% of total outstanding ABCP and as a result saw massive decline in the value
of its external debt to the tune of 54% of total losses (Figure 6). The UK, who held 16% of
the total stock of ABCP bore 21% of total losses.
Reinforcing the plausibility of the mechanism described above linking prevalence of ABCP
conduits and liquidity dry ups entailing losses on assets, we nd a strong positive correlation
between the measures of dollar shortage in some banking systems developed by McGuire
and von Peter (2009) and the propensity of those systems to set up ABCP conduits. Figure
7 uses the upper limits of the dollar shortage measures developed by McGuire and von Peter
(2009) both at the oce and at the group level. Those measures are constructed by assuming
that net interbank borrowing in dollar, net borrowing on the FX swap markets in dollars
(which the authors back out from the balance sheet identity assuming no open positions on
the forex), dollar borrowing from ocial monetary authorities, as well as liabilities to non
banks are all short term. The dierence between those short term dollar liabilities and the
longer term dollar assets gives the dollar funding gap or dollar shortage of a country banking
system.31 With the exception of Switzerland, which did not appear to have any signicant
30We are very grateful to Viral Acharya and Philip Schnabl for sharing their data with us. Their dataset
consists in the following countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Frecnh, Germany, Italy,
Japan, Netherthelands, spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, USA.
31We are grateful to the authors for providing us with their data, whose construction is described in
McGuire and von Peter (2009). The group-level estimates are constructed by aggregating banks' global
25exposure to ABCPs in 2007, there is a very clear link between measures of dollar shortage
and ABCP conduits.
Finally, we report in Figure 8 the total valuation losses together with the Kaufmann,
Kraay and Mastruzzi (2010) indicator of the quality of the regulatory environment. Recent
research by Giannone, Lenza and Reichlin (2011) nds that the severity of the crisis was
strongly and robustly positively related to the degree of liberalization in credit markets, as
measured by indicators or `regulatory quality'.32 In our sample, the correlation between
losses and the Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2010) indicator of the quality of the regu-
latory environment is also positive (0.45) and visual inspection conrms that countries with
more liberalized credit markets tended to suer larger valuation losses on their external port-
folio. One may conjecture, that the most deregulated markets where also the ones in which
investors "splurged" the most and increased their loadings on (once lucrative) toxic assets.
5 Conclusion
The global crisis of 2007-2009 led to massive changes in relative asset prices. We construct
a dataset that allows us to analyze the geography of wealth transfers during the crisis. The
`heatmap' we produce highlight a very diverse set of outcomes depending on the structure
of the structure of countries' external portfolios. Some saw the value of their net assets
plunging, others beneted from large capital gains. The countries whose net international
asset positions deteriorated provided wealth transfers to the others at a time where marginal
utility of consumption was very high. For that reason they can be regarded as "global
insurers", as suggested in Gourinchas, Rey and Govillot (2010). Interestingly, we nd that
the United States, the country at the centre of the international monetary system and issuer
balance sheets into a consolidated whole, and then calculating funding risk on this aggregated balance sheet.
The oce-level estimates are constructed by calculating funding risk at the oce location level, and then
aggregating the series up across oce locations for each banking system. By construction, the oce level
estimates should at least be as large as the corresponding group level.
32For group of countries, we assign the regulatory quality index as follows: Germany for euro area, St Kitts
for oshore centers, Saudi Arabia for oil exporters, Thailand for emerging Asia, Norway for other advanced
countries, and Peru for other latin-american countries.
26of the main reserve assets, the US Treasuries, provided most of the insurance during the crisis,
as its international investment position deteriorated massively. But other countries, which
may be regarded more like regional insurers joined in, such as Switzerland, the Euro area
or even China. A general pattern in our data is that most countries long equity or direct
investment faced losses on their net positions, as risky assets took some of the sharpest
valuation falls in the crisis. For portfolio debt, the exact structure of portfolio matters, and
in particular the relative weights of government bonds versus toxic corporate debt made
an important dierence for the outcomes. We nd that some correlation of exposure to
ABCP conduits -mostly in US dollars, existing dollar shortage measures, and losses on the
debt portfolio. Finally our exercise, just like Milesi-Ferretti, Strobbe and Tamirisa (2010)
underlines important data issues regarding cross country coverage of international investment
positions and ows.
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331971:3 2007:2
Gross Liabilities 11.2 130.8






Direct Investment 1.2 25.6
Gross Asset 16.9 119.1
Gold 1.1 1.2
Bank Loans 5.3 36.1
Debt 1.4 10.0
Equity 0.7 35.0
Direct Investment 8.4 36.5
Net 5.7 -11.7
Safe & Liquid/Liabilities 66.6 63.5
Risky & Illiquid/Assets 53.9 60.0
Table 1: US External Balance Sheet, percent of US GDP. FDI at market value. Source:
Gourinchas, Rey and Govillot (2010)
34Positions as of: 2007:4 2009:1 Change
% of GDP % of GDP bn (US dollars)
Net -10.2 -31.4 -21.1 -2,966
of which
cumulated current account -5.5 -767
valuation change -15.7 -2,199
Gross Liabilities 132.6 113.3 -21.6 -3,040
Bank Loans 38.9 34.8 -4.8 -669
Debt 46.0 48.8 2.1 288
of which:
Government 22.3 29.7 7.0 987
Corporate 23.7 19.2 -5.0 -699
Equity 22.6 13.5 -9.5 -1,333
Direct Investment 25.2 16.2 -9.4 -1,326
Gross Asset 122.5 81.8 -42.7 -6,006
Gold 1.5 1.7 0.2 22
Bank Loans 36.2 35.4 -1.4 -200
Debt 11.1 8.8 -2.5 -353
Equity 36.7 17.0 -20.4 -2,866
Direct Investment 36.9 19.0 -18.6 -2,609
Table 2: Change in US External Balance Sheet. Percent of US GDP. 2007:4 to 2009:1. FDI

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A Countries and regional groups
Individual countries:
Brazil, Canada, China, Hong Kong, India, Japan, Russia, Singapore, Switzerland, United
Kingdom, United States
Regional groups:
Emerging Asia: Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand.
Euro area: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain.
Other advanced countries: Australia, Denmark, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden.
Country groups that are only included as a vis- a-vis category:
Oshore centers: Aruba, Andorra, Bahamas, Barbados, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands,
Cayman Islands, Gibraltar, Guernsey, Isle of Man, Jersey, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Macao,
Mauritius, Monaco, Netherlands Antilles, Panama, Samoa, San Marino, Vanuatu, Vatican,
West Indies.
Oil exporters: Algeria, Bahrain, Gabon, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Oman, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates.
Other Latin American countries: Argentina, Chile, Mexico.
B Data Appendix
B.1 Aggregate positions and ows
International Investment Position (except foreign exchange reserves): we rely on na-
tional sources for Canada (Statistics Canada), China (State Administration of Foreign Ex-
change (SAFE)), Euro Area (European Central Bank), Japan (Bank of Japan), Switzerland
(Swiss National Bank), United Kingdom (Pink Book) and the United States (Bureau of
Economic Analysis). Data for all other countries were obtained from the IMF Balance of
Payments database.
Foreign exchange reserves: we use \total reserves minus gold" available from the IMF
International Financial Statistics database.
Financial ows: IMF Balance of Payments statistics
B.2 Bilateral positions
The data construction closely follows Milesi-Ferretti, Strobbe and Tamirisa (2010). We
collect annual bilateral positions data for end-2007 and end-2008.
Brazil
42FDI: reported bilateral FDI assets and liabilities are measured at book value. To obtain
market value estimates of Brazil's bilateral direct investment positions, we use market value
data derived from partner countries' reported assets and liabilities vis- a-vis Brazil. Bilateral
positions are imputed from the following countries: Australia, Canada, China, Denmark,
Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States.
Portfolio equity and debt: based on reported and derived portfolio equity/debt assets
and liabilities available in IMF Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey tables 1.1, 1.2 and
5.1, 5.2.
Foreign Exchange Reserves: following Milesi-Ferretti et al. (2010), the US dollar share
of total reserves is estimated as the dierence between US debt liabilities vis- a-vis Brazil and
Brazil's debt assets in the US as reported in the CPIS. The remainder is assumed to be held
in euros.
Canada
FDI: we use the data on Canadian direct investment abroad and foreign direct investment
to Canada by country and sector available from the Oce of the Chief Economist of the Cana-
dian Ministry of Foreign Aairs and International Trade (http://www.international.gc.ca/economist-
economiste/statistics-statistiques/investments-investissements.aspx?lang=eng)
Portfolio equity and debt: based on reported and derived portfolio equity/debt assets
and liabilities available in IMF Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey tables 1.1, 1.2 and
5.1, 5.2.
Foreign exchange reserves: we use the currency composition of reserves published by the
Canadian department of Finance (http://www.n.gc.ca/pub/oir-ro-archives-eng.asp)
China
China does not report the geographical allocation of its portfolio investment holdings,
as it does not take part in the CPIS. We investigated details national sources and hand
collected data to remedy this shortcoming. International Investment Position data are not
at market value in ocial sources (SAFE). We construct data on bilateral equity assets and
liability and market value as well as data on debt assets. We also manage to reconstruct
bilateral FDI assets and liabilities at market value using Ministry of Commerce data. We
reconstructed bilateral data on Chinese external assets at market value from various Chinese
data sources.
FDI Assets: The only market value estimates of Chinese FDI have been done in 2004.This
was the rst survey ever been done on Chinese FDI. After 2004, government agencies added
up ow data to estimate the ocial IIP. Therefore, the ocial IIP of 2005-2011 are not at
market value.
We obtain Ministry of Commerce data with a very good geographical breakdown. The
aggregate numbers are not exactly identical to the IIP SAFE numbers as the Ministry of
Commerce has a dierent statistics standard from SAFE. The data are at market value so
we use the 2004 stock (based on survey data) and cumulate ows using the corresponding
stock indexes for valuation adjustment.
FDI Liabilities: We use the 2004 stock (based on survey data) and cumulate ows using
the Shanghai stock index for valuation adjustment.
43Portfolio debt: Portfolio debt is held mainly by 5 Chinese state-owned international banks
(Bank of China, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, China Construction Bank, Agri-
cultural Bank of China, Chinese Development Bank) and the sovereign wealth fund CIC. We
have a detailed geographical decomposition of cross border claims (into Hong Kong, Other
Asia Pacic locations, North and South America, Europe, Middle East and Africa) , and
separately, a currency breakdown (RMB, dollar, euro, HK dollar, yen, CHF and other) of
overseas loans and of securities held for the Bank of China33. In 2010, the total amount
of cross border claims for BoC is 1,260,10 millions RMB while the amount of non RMB
assets is about double at 2,526,5777 millions RMB. This indicates that a sizable amount
of the domestic assets of the BoC are in foreign currency. Making a set of straightforward
assumptions34, we are able to construct for 2007-2010 a table of cross border security hold-
ings disaggregated by country and currency. The Bank of China is historically the main
player overseas (Bank of China has been ranked No. 3 in 2009 within all banks in the world
by market capitalization). We have a coarser set of data for the three other banks (ICC,
CCB, ABC). We obtained as detailed data as possible from the banks report. For the other
banks (except CDB), we could obtain data only on their cross border claims by locations.
We apply the Bank of China weights to allocate assets between investment securities and
total claims, by location, thereby constructing a table of securities by location35. For CDB,
we obtained securities by currencies. We allocated the dollar securities to the US and the
(small) remainder of overseas currency securities to Hong Kong.
33We have a breakdown into: derivative nancial assets; loans and advances to customers (net); investment
securities (broken down in available for sale ; held to maturity and loans and receivables) and other assets.
We present in our spreadsheet all the source data we gathered. We work with the assumptions that all the
investment securities are debt securities. In principle they could also be equities. In 2007-2008 however we
have the exact amount of portfolio equity bought by all our 5 banks via the QDII system (see below for
the construction of portfolio equity assets). This amount is less than $4 bn, so we treat it as negligible (the
order of magnitude of our total debt asset numbers are in the range of $200 bn).
34The data indicate that there is more Hong Kong dollar assets than claims to Hong Kong, more dollar
assets than claims to North and South America, less euro and sterling assets than claims to Europe, less
yen assets than claims to other Asia Pacic location. We make the following assumptions: all Hong Kong
claims are in HK$; all euro and sterling assets are to Europe, all yen assets are to "other Asia Pacic"; all
North and South America, Middle East and Africa claims are in $. Any remaining Europe claims not in
euro or sterling are assumed to be in $, any other Asia Pacic claims not in yen are assumed to be in US $.
We compute the share of investment securities in total US $ assets and use this weight to derive securities
holdings in dollar portfolios, for all geographical areas.
We focus on the investment securities part of the claims (securities available for sale; held to maturity and
loans and receivables) of the bank balance sheet. We do not use here the data on loans. We check that the
total amount of US $ securities we obtain for cross border holdings is inferior to the total amount of reported
US $ securities in the total assets of the bank. For example for 2010, the amount of US $ denominated
cross border securities we estimate is 105, 883 millions RMB and the reported US dollars securities of the
bank amount to 290,943 millions RMB. The dierence is therefore domestic holdings of US $ denominated
securities.
35We give below the market capitalization of the four largest stated owned banks in China.The Bank of
China (BoC), the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), the China Construction Bank (CCB)
, the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC). These are the only banks having signicant international activity
and its is clear that the Bank of China is by far the most international one.
Banks: (2010) Bank of China ICBC CCB ABC
Total Assets (million RMB) 10,459,865 12,779,711 10,810,317 10,337,406
Cross border claims (million RMB) 1,260,170 381,982 272,829 82,254
overseas assset ratio 12.0% 3.9% 2.5% 0.8%
44We have data on xed income holdings for CIC but we do not have explicit geographical
data. We are told however (private communication with Chinese sources) that it is almost
all US debt.
It is our belief that the union of these ve banks and CIC cover the universe of Chinese
investors in international debt assets (foreign exchange reserves are accounted for separetely).
Portfolio debt liabilities: We do not have any direct source for debt liabilities and have
to take the ocial IIP numbers. The amount involved are very small (in the order of 20
times smaller than debt assets according to the IIP data).
Foreign exchange reserves: The currency composition of the Chinese reserves is not
disclosed. Nevertheless, we have one snapshot of the currency weights. In September 2010,
the China Securities Journal revealed the following breakdown for the $2,450 billion reserves
of the People's Bank of China: 65% in dollars, 26% in euros, 5% in sterling, and 3% in yen.
We assume that these weights are similar in 2007-2008, as they are likely to be slow moving
(by doing so we probably slightly underestimate the dollar share in 2007-2008). For the
aggregate amount of reserves we use total reserves minus gold from IFS.
Portfolio equity assets: Equity investment overseas is strictly regulated. QDII is a quota
system for domestic investors to hold equity abroad. We obtained a record of all authorized
investments in foreign equity for the years 2006-2010. from SAFE. According to Chinese
sources, most of the investment reported in QDII is in equity, ETFs or commodities. Un-
fortunately, we have the breakdown by domestic investor name but not disaggregated by
geographical area of investment. However, the amounts involved are very small due to QDII
having been launched only in 2006. Besides, China does not have many wealth management
services to help Chinese invest in overseas equity markets. For 2006, the total ows amount
to $9,675 million, for 2007 $30,544.7 million and for 2008 $3,255 million. Furthermore, pri-
vate communication with Chinese sources indicate that about 50% of the QDII allocation is
equity out of which about 40% is in the Hong Kong market 5% to the US and 5% to Sin-
gapore. We value the remaining QDII assets using a global commodity price index (Source
IMF: PALLFNF Index).
We have detailed data on the geographical location of the equity holdings of the sovereign
wealth fund CIC. It is our belief that CIC and QDII cover the entire spectrum of portfolio
equity investment overseas.
Portfolio equity liabilities: We use partner country data.
Emerging Asia
FDI: reported bilateral FDI assets and liabilities are measured at book value. To obtain
market value estimates of Emerging Asia's bilateral direct investment positions, we use
market value data derived from partner countries' reported assets and liabilities vis- a-vis
Emerging Asia. Bilateral positions are imputed from the following countries: Australia,
Canada, China, Denmark, Hong Kong, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, Sweden,
Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States.
Portfolio equity and debt: based on reported and derived portfolio equity/debt assets
and liabilities available in IMF Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey tables 1.1, 1.2 and
5.1, 5.2.
Foreign exchange reserves: We use the 2007 currency composition in Milesi-Ferretti,
Strobbe and Tamirisa (2010), netting-out the Taiwan-US debt liabilities position from the
45Milesi-Ferretti, Strobbe and Tamirisa (2010) bilateral USD FX position. For 2008, we assume
that the currency share is unchanged from 2007.
Euro Area
FDI: reported bilateral FDI assets and liabilities are measured at book value. To obtain
market value estimates of the Euro area's bilateral direct investment positions, we use market
value data derived from partner countries' reported assets and liabilities vis- a-vis the Euro
area. Bilateral positions are imputed from the following countries: Australia, Canada, China,
Denmark, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom
and the United States. The Euro area total is calculated as the sum of the individual member
countries bilateral positions.
Portfolio equity and debt: based on reported and derived portfolio equity/debt assets
and liabilities available in IMF Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey tables 1.1, 1.2 and
5.1, 5.2. The Euro are total is calculated as the sum of the individual member countries
bilateral positions, netting-out the intra Euro area positions.
Foreign exchange reserves: we use the 2007 currency composition in Milesi-Ferretti,
Strobbe and Tamirisa (2010) and, for 2008, assume that the currency shares are unchanged
from 2007.
Hong Kong
FDI: we use tables 050 and 048 on the geographical breakdown of outward and inward FDI
published by the Census and Statistics Department of the Government of Hong Kong.
(http://www.censtatd.gov.hk/hong kong statistics/statistics by subject/index.jsp)
Portfolio equity and debt: based on reported and derived portfolio equity/debt assets
and liabilities available in IMF Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey tables 1.1, 1.2 and
5.1, 5.2.
Foreign exchange reserves: we use the 2007 currency composition in Milesi-Ferretti,
Strobbe and Tamirisa (2010) and, for 2008, assume that the currency shares are unchanged
from 2007.
India
FDI: reported bilateral FDI assets and liabilities are measured at book value. To obtain
market value estimates of India's bilateral direct investment positions, we use market value
data derived from partner countries' reported assets and liabilities vis- a-vis India. Bilateral
positions are imputed from the following countries: Australia, Canada, China, Denmark,
Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the
United States.
Portfolio equity and debt: based on reported and derived portfolio equity/debt assets
and liabilities available in IMF Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey tables 1.1, 1.2 and
5.1, 5.2.
Foreign exchange reserves: we estimate the currency composition of reserves based on
the aggregate currency shares for emerging markets in the IMF COFER database.
Japan
46FDI: we use the geographical breakdown of outward and inward FDI provided in the Bank of
Japan publication \Regional direct investment position assets and liabilities (end of 2009)"
(http://www.boj.or.jp/en/statistics/br/bop/index.htm/)
Portfolio equity and debt: based on reported and derived portfolio equity/debt assets
and liabilities available in IMF Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey tables 1.1, 1.2 and
5.1, 5.2.
Foreign exchange reserves: we use the 2007 currency composition in Milesi-Ferretti,
Strobbe and Tamirisa (2010) and, for 2008, assume that the currency shares are unchanged
from 2007.
Other advanced
FDI: For Australia we use table 2, \Foreign Investment in Australia, Level of Investment by
country and Country Groups by type of investment and year", and table 5 \Australian Invest-
ment Abroad, Level of Investment by country and Country Groups by type of investment and
year" provided by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS).
For Denmark we use the geographical breakdown provided in table 3 \Direct Investments bro-
ken down by country" provided by the central bank of Denmark ( http://www.nationalbanken.dk).
For New Zealand we use the geographical breakdown provided in table 3: "Stock of direct
investment by country" in the \Balance of Payments and International Investment Position:
Year ended 31 March 2010" provided by Statistics New Zealand (http://www.stats.govt.nz).
For Sweden and Norway we obtain the geographical breakdown of direct investment from the
OECD (http://stats.oecd.org/BrandedView.aspx?oecd bv id=idi-data-en&doi=data-00337-
en).
Portfolio equity and debt: based on reported and derived portfolio equity/debt assets
and liabilities available in IMF Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey tables 1.1, 1.2 and
5.1, 5.2. The country group total is calculated as the sum of the individual member countries
bilateral positions.
Foreign exchange reserves: we use the 2007 currency composition in Milesi-Ferretti,
Strobbe and Tamirisa (2010) and assume that the 2008 currency shares are unchanged from
2007.
Russia
FDI: reported bilateral FDI assets and liabilities are measured at book value. To obtain
market value estimates of Russia's bilateral direct investment positions, we use market value
data derived from partner countries' reported assets and liabilities vis- a-vis Russia. Bilateral
positions are imputed from the following countries: Australia, Canada, China, Denmark,
Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States.
Portfolio equity and debt: based on reported and derived portfolio equity/debt assets
and liabilities available in IMF Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey tables 1.1, 1.2 and
5.1, 5.2.
Foreign exchange reserves: we use the currency composition reported in the annual
reports of the central bank of Russia (http://www.cbr.ru/eng/publ/main.asp?Prtid=God).
Singapore
47FDI: for outward direct investment we use table 2 \Total Direct Investment Abroad by Coun-
try/Region, 2000-2009" of the report \Singapore's Investment Abroad 2009" and for inward
direct investment we use table 2 \Foreign Direct Investment in Singapore by Country/Region,
1998-2008" of the report \Foreign equity investment in Singapore, 2008". Both reports are
published by Statistics Singapore (http://www.singstat.gov.sg/pubn/business.html).
Portfolio equity and debt: based on reported and derived portfolio equity/debt assets
and liabilities available in IMF Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey tables 1.1, 1.2 and
5.1, 5.2.
Foreign exchange reserves: we use the 2007 currency composition in Milesi-Ferretti,
Strobbe and Tamirisa (2010) and assume that the 2008 currency shares are unchanged from
2007.
Switzerland
FDI: we rely on the geographical composition provided in table 1.2 \Swiss direct investment
abroad by country" (http://www.snb.ch/en/iabout/stat/statpub/fdi/stats/fdi/fdi ChDirAus LgKapBe)
and table 2.2 \Foreign direct investment in Switzerland, by country"
(http://www.snb.ch/en/iabout/stat/statpub/fdi/stats/fdi/fdi AusDirCh KapBeHL) published
by the Swiss National Bank.
Portfolio equity and debt: based on reported and derived portfolio equity/debt assets
and liabilities available in IMF Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey tables 1.1, 1.2 and
5.1, 5.2.
Foreign exchange reserves: we use the currency allocation of ocial reserves provided in
chapter 5 of the annual reports of the Swiss National Bank
(http://www.snb.ch/en/iabout/pub/annrep/id/pub annrep)
United Kingdom
FDI: we use the geographical composition provided in table 3.1 \Net FDI international in-
vestment position abroad analysed by area and main country, end 2000 to end 2009" and
table 6.1 \Net FDI International positions in the United Kingdom analysed by area and main
country, 2000 to 2009" in the \Foreign Direct Investment Business Monitor MA4" published
by the Oce of National Statistics (http://www.statistics.gov.uk/statbase/product.asp?vlnk=9614).
Portfolio equity and debt: based on reported and derived portfolio equity/debt assets
and liabilities available in IMF Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey tables 1.1, 1.2 and
5.1, 5.2.
Foreign exchange reserves: we use the currency composition of the UK government's of-
cial reserves published in the quarterly annex to the \UK International Reserves & Foreign
Currency Liquidity Template" (http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/reserves/intro.htm).
United States
FDI: for bilateral outward direct investment we rely on the table \U.S. direct Investment
Abroad: Selected Items by Detailed Country, 2005-2009"
(http://www.bea.gov/international/di1usdbal.htm) and for bilateral inward direct invest-
ment on the table \Foreign Direct Investment in the United States: Selected Items by De-
tailed Country, 2005-2009" (http://www.bea.gov/international/xls/LongCountry.xls) both
published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
48Portfolio equity and debt: for portfolio equity and debt assets we use IMF CPIS tables
1.1 and 1.2. Portfolio equity and debt liabilities were obtained from the Survey on Portfolio
Holdings of U.S. Securities as of June 2007 and June 2008, published by the U.S. Treasury (
HREFhttp://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic/Pages/fpis.aspx). Po-
sitions are updated using the monthly estimates provided in Bertaut and Tryon (2007)
(HREFhttp://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2007/910/default.htm)
Foreign exchange reserves: we use the 2007 currency composition in Milesi-Ferretti,
Strobbe and Tamirisa (2010) and assume that the 2008 currency shares are unchanged from
2007.
B.3 FDI market value estimation
We denote market value by MV, book value by BV, current cost by CC and historical cost
by HV. The list of countries providing both aggregate and bilateral FDI positions data at
MV includes:
 Australia (IIP & bilateral positions; see http://abs.gov.au/austats/abs@.nsf/mf/5370.0.55.001)
 Hong Kong (IIP & bilateral positions)
 New Zealand (IIP & bilateral positions, except for some rms that provide positions
at BV; see http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite fdistat/docs/wid cp nz en.pdf)
 Norway (IIP & bilateral positions; see http://www.ssb.no/intinvpos en/about.html)
For the following countries, we estimate both the aggregate FDI positions and the bilateral
positions at MV:
 Canada (IIP & bilateral positions = BV, we estimate MV, initial 2005 market to book
value ratio provided by Simard and Boulay (n.d.))
 China (IIP & bilateral positions = BV, we estimate MV, initial 2004 aggregate and
bilateral FDI positions are at market value)
 Denmark (IIP & bilateral positions = BV, we estimate MV, initial 2006 market value
estimate provided by Kumah, Damgaard and Elkjaer (2009))
 Switzerland (IIP & bilateral positions = BV, we estimate MV, initial 2005 market
value estimate provided by Stoes and Tille (2009))
 United Kingdom (IIP & bilateral positions = BV, we estimate MV, initial 2005 market
value estimate provided by Kubelec, Orskaug and Tanaka (2007))
Countries providing aggregate FDI data at market value along with ocial valuation series:
 Japan (IIP & bilateral positions = BV, Bank of Japan provides estimate of aggre-
gate FDI abroad & inward market-to-book value ratio, we use this to obtain bilateral
positions at MV)
49 Sweden (IIP & bilateral positions = BV, also provides estimate of aggregate FDI at
MV, we use these to obtain bilateral positions at MV)
 United States (IIP = CC, BEA bilateral positions = HC, market-to-HC ratio provided
by BEA, we use these to obtain bilateral positions at MV)
The following countries do not report aggregate FDI at MV and we are unable to compute
our own estimates. Reported bilateral positions are at BV.
 Brazil (IIP = BV, bilateral positions at MV imputed from partner countries)
 Emerging Asia (IIP = BV, bilateral positions at MV imputed from partner countries)
 Euro Area (IIP & bilateral = BV, bilateral positions at MV imputed from partner
countries)
 India (IIP = BV, bilateral positions at MV imputed from partner countries)
 Russia (IIP = BV, bilateral positions at MV imputed from partner countries)
Methodology for market value estimation:
1. we start from an initial estimate of the aggregate FDI abroad/inward position at MV
(usually for 2005, provided by statistical agency or other, see above).
2. multiply the date t position in USD with the weighted average of the destination
countries' USD ex-dividend equity index returns, with weights corresponding to the
date t FDI portfolio weights (FDI abroad); or home country USD equity index return
(inward FDI)
3. add USD nancial outow/inow to obtain date t+1 position at MV
4. calculate market-to-book value ratio for each date
5. calculate bilateral positions at MV using 4)
Due to data limitations, we are unfortunately unable to obtain full bilateral FDI balance
sheets at market value for those countries where positions were imputed from partner country
FDI assets and liabilities. Instances with bilateral positions unavailable for at least one
country of a source/partner country pair are indicated with "na" in the matrix of bilateral
valuation gains and losses on the net FDI portfolio.
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Figure 1: Heat Map of Valuation Gains and Losses
The gure reports total valuation gains/losses. Dark red: losses in excess of $600bn. Light red: losses smaller than $600bn. Light green: gains smaller
than $400bn. Dark green: gains in excess of $400bn.
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(a) Portfolio Equity
File View Edit Visualize Merge
Sh o win g  all rows o p tio n s Map st y le  sav e d.
L o c atio n kml_4326 Disp lay   as  h eat  map Co n f igure  in f o   win do w Co n f igure  sty les Ex p o rt  to   KML Get  KML   n etwo rk   lin k Get  emb eddab le  lin k
heatmap _0 8 21 11 Natural  Earth
2 0 0 0   k m
2 0 0 0   mi Map   data  ©2 0 1 1   Geo c en tre  Co n sultin g,   Map L in k ,   Tele  Atlas
+Pierre- Oliv ier Gmail Calen dar Do c umen ts Ph o to s Reader Web mo re Pierre- Oliv ier  Go urin c h as 0 Sh are!
(b) Portfolio Debt
The gure reports portfolio gains/losses for equity (panel (a)) and debt (panel(b)). Dark red: losses in
excess of $600bn. Light red: losses smaller than $600bn. Light green: gains smaller than $400bn. Dark
green: gains in excess of $400bn.
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(a) Direct Investment
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(b) Currency Gains/Losses
The gure reports direct investment valuation gains/losses (panel (a)) and currency gains/losses (panel (b)).
Dark red: losses in excess of $600bn. Light red: losses smaller than $600bn. Light green: gains smaller










































































































































































































































































































































































































The gure reports for each country or group the share of ABCP in that country debt claims position in
2007, as well as the rate of loss on debt assets between 2007:4 and 2008:4. Source: Authors' calculations and
Acharya and Schnabl (2010)












The gure reports for each country or group the share of ABCP in total ABCP hholdings in 2007, as well
as the share of overall loss on debt assets between 2007:4 and 2008:4. Source: Authors' calculations and
Acharya and Schnabl (2010)








The gure reports the upper limit of the dollar shortage measures constructed at the oce and group level
together with ABCP exposure data at the country level. Source: McGuire and von Peter (2009) and Acharya
and Schnabl (2010)















The gure reports the index of regulatory quality from Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2010), together
with total valuation losses (+) or gains (-)
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